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Abstract: Research in psychology and behavioural economics shows that individuals’ choices 
often depend on ‘irrelevant’ contextual factors.  This presents problems for normative 
economics, which has traditionally used preference-satisfaction as its criterion.  A common 
response is to claim that individuals have context-independent latent preferences which are 
‘distorted’ by psychological factors, and that latent preferences should be respected.  This 
response implicitly uses a model of human action in which each human being has an ‘inner 
rational agent’.  I argue that this model is psychologically ungrounded.  Although references 
to latent preferences appear in psychologically-based explanations of context-dependent 
choice, latent preferences serve no explanatory purpose.  
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A recurring finding of behavioural economics is that individuals’ choices between what 
might naturally be thought of as given outcomes can vary according to apparently irrelevant 
features of the context in which those choices are made.  For example, faced with a choice 
between a specific amount of money and a specific consumer good, people are less likely to 
choose the money if the decision is framed in terms of selling something that they own than if 
it is framed as a straight choice (Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler, 1990).  When choosing 
between alternative snacks to be delivered at a fixed time a week in the future, people are 
more likely to choose unhealthy but hunger-satisfying items if they are hungrier at the time 
they make the decision (Read and van Leeuwen, 1998).  In calling such contextual features 
‘irrelevant’, I mean that they have no obvious relevance to the decision-maker’s well-being, 
interests or goals; changes in these features seem therefore not to provide good reasons for a 
person to change her preferences.  Nevertheless, there are well-grounded psychological 
explanations of why revealed preferences are context-dependent.  These findings present a 
problem for normative economics, because there is a long tradition in economics of using 
preference-satisfaction as the criterion for evaluating alternative policy options.  That public 
decision-makers should respect individuals’ preferences has long been an important idea in 
liberal political philosophy.  But should we – indeed, can we – respect context-dependent 
preferences? 
 Many economists and philosophers find the idea of respecting context-dependent 
preferences problematic, either because there seems to be no good reason for thinking that  
such preferences are indicators of individual well-being, or more fundamentally, because the 
concept of respecting a person’s preferences is thought to be ill-defined unless those 
preferences satisfy minimal properties of internal consistency.1  However, the same writers 
are often reluctant to conclude that there is no need to respect preferences at all, and that 
public decision-makers should simply use their own best judgements about the effects of 
policies on individuals’ well-being – a conclusion that seems unacceptably paternalistic.  A 
common escape route from this impasse is to argue that individuals whose choices are 
context-dependent are not revealing the preferences that in some meaningful sense they 
                                                          
1
 I have argued for an approach to normative economics which attaches value to individuals’ 
opportunities rather than to the satisfaction of their preferences.  This approach does not depend on 
any assumptions about the coherence of individuals’ preference while, in a certain sense, respecting 
whatever preferences individuals act on (Sugden, 2004, 2007; McQuillin and Sugden, 2012).  It is 
therefore not vulnerable to the problems that are the topic of the current paper.  However, this 
approach  has not yet found much favour in economics or philosophy. 
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actually hold, and that their ‘true’, ‘underlying’ or ‘latent’ preferences are context-
independent.  The disparity between latent preference and choice is attributed to 
psychological mechanisms which induce systematic biases or errors in reasoning.  If these 
latent preferences could be recovered, it would be possible to use the traditional methods of 
welfare economics to work out how best to satisfy them.  Following Hausman (2012, p. 102), 
I will call the process of recovering latent preferences preference purification.  I will call the 
broader strategy of using such preferences in welfare economics behavioural welfare 
economics. By using this strategy, it is thought, the principle of respect for individuals’ 
preferences can be retained. 
 In another paper, Infante, Lecouteux and I (2015) have examined how this strategy 
has been used by behavioural economists.  We present a critique of behavioural welfare 
economics from the perspective of philosophy of mind.  We argue that the strategy 
understands human agency as if each individual human being has a ‘rational true self’ or 
‘inner rational agent’ which has access to some mode of valid reasoning that can generate 
context-independent preferences.  Psychological explanations of context-dependent 
preferences are then interpreted as if the individual’s psychology was an external force 
subverting the will of the true self.  The inner rational agent is not endowed with any 
psychology of its own, and no description is given of the mode of reasoning it is supposed to 
use.  We argue that this model of agency is ungrounded and implausible.  In Section 1 of the 
current paper, I summarise that argument. 
 However, my main aim in the present paper is to consider behavioural welfare 
economics from a different perspective, that of cognitive psychology.  One reason for 
suspicion about the model of the inner rational agent is that its capacity for correct reasoning 
is not given any psychological explanation.  So one way of trying to make sense of the model 
is to understand decision-making, both rational and irrational, in terms of psychological 
mechanisms of mental processing, and to try to isolate some component or aspect of this 
mental processing that corresponds with rational deliberation and that is capable of 
generating context-independent preferences.  If such a component could be isolated, and if 
actual behaviour could be represented as the result of interaction between it and other 
psychological mechanisms, the isolated component might be interpreted as the psychological 
substrate of the inner rational agent and the other mechanisms as potential causes of error. 
 In Section 2, I consider this isolation strategy in general terms, and argue that it is 
unlikely to succeed.  A psychological explanation of context-dependent choices does not 
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need a concept of ‘true’ preference.  In the most credible of such explanations, responses to 
contextual cues are an integral part of the mental processes of decision-making.  The idea of 
recovering latent preferences by removing the influence of these cues seems incoherent.   
 In Sections 3 and 4, I support this general claim by examining two specific models – 
one from behavioural economics, the other from cognitive psychology – which at first sight 
might seem to provide clues about how latent preferences can be isolated.  Both models 
represent the role of attention in the mental processes that underlie decision-making.  The 
first model is typical of much current work in behavioural economics in its use of concepts of 
correct reasoning and latent preferences in relation to what are supposed to be models of 
mental processing, understood empirically.  The second model has a much richer 
representation of mental processes and is presented with much less – but, interestingly, still 
with some – reference to correctness of reasoning.  I will argue that, in both models, concepts 
of correctness play no explanatory role.  Thus, however successful these models may be in 
explaining decision-making, they do not provide any empirical grounding for the concept of 
latent preferences. 
1.  The model of the inner rational agent2 
Preference purification is at the core of ‘behavioural welfare economics’ – a method of 
normative analysis that  has been used by many prominent behavioural economists. Infante, 
Lecouteux and I document the use or advocacy of this method by, among others, Bleichrodt, 
Pinto-Prades and Wakker (2001), Camerer et al. (2003), Sunstein and Thaler (2003; 
henceforth ‘ST’), Kőszegi and Rabin (2007), Salant and Rubinstein (2008), Thaler and 
Sunstein (2008; henceforth ‘TS’), and Bernheim and Rangel (2009).  Taking a more 
philosophical perspective, Hausman (2012, pp. 100–102) gives a qualified endorsement to 
preference purification as a means of making judgements about individual well-being. In the 
present paper, I will focus on the particularly influential work of Sunstein and Thaler. 
 Sunstein and Thaler claim that the findings of behavioural economics make 
paternalism unavoidable.  This claim is developed in relation to the now-familiar example of 
a cafeteria director choosing how to display food items when she knows that her customers’ 
choices are influenced by the prominence with which different items are displayed.  
Characterising their anti-paternalist opponents as advocating that the director should ‘give 
                                                          
2
 This section is based on Infante, Lecouteux and Sugden (2015a, 2015b). 
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consumers what she thinks they would choose on their own’, Sunstein and Thaler claim that 
the anti-paternalist position is ‘incoherent’, because the customers lack ‘well-formed’ (that is, 
context-independent) preferences.  In their 2004 paper, Sunstein and Thaler conclude that the 
only reasonable decision criterion for the cafeteria director is to ‘make the choices that she 
thinks would make the customers best off, all things considered’ (ST, pp. 1164–1165, 1182).  
In their 2008 book, they make a significant revision to this criterion, declaring that their 
recommendations are designed to ‘make choosers better off, as judged by themselves’ (TS, p. 
5; italics in original).  The italicised clause recurs with minor variations throughout TS (e.g. 
pp. 10, 12, 80).  The implication is that the addressee of Sunstein and Thaler’s work – 
originally called the ‘planner’, but restyled in 2008 as the ‘choice architect’ – tries to respect 
each individual’s subjective judgements about what makes him better off. 
 But how are these judgements to be defined, and how can they reconstructed?  
Sunstein and Thaler are coy about this, but they provide some clues about their thinking when, 
immediately after presenting the principle of trying to make choosers ‘better off, as judged by 
themselves’, they undertake to show that 
in many cases, individuals make pretty bad decisions – decisions that they would 
not have made if they had paid full attention and possessed complete information, 
unlimited cognitive abilities, and complete self-control.  (TS, p. 5) 
The implication is that what makes an individual better off ‘as judged by himself’ is defined 
by the preferences he would have revealed, had his decision-making not been affected by  
limitations of attention, information, cognitive ability or self-control.  So Sunstein and 
Thaler’s approach to normative economics treats context-dependent choices as the result of 
errors of reasoning.  It requires the reconstruction of individuals’ latent preferences by 
simulating what they would have chosen, had their reasoning not been subject to these errors.  
This is preference purification.  Clearly, this approach can overcome the problem of context-
dependence in actual choices only if, as Sunstein and Thaler implicitly assume is the case, the 
corresponding latent preferences are context-independent. 
 Behavioural welfare economics can be characterised more precisely as having the 
following four properties.  (1) Behavioural welfare economics is intended to apply to cases in 
which individuals’ revealed preferences depend on contextual factors that have little or no 
apparent relevance to those individuals’ interests or well-being.  (2) The normative criterion 
is the satisfaction of each individual’s latent preferences, defined as the preferences he would 
reveal in the absence of any errors that might be caused by limitations of attention, 
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information, cognitive ability or self-control.  (3) Latent preferences are interpreted as 
expressing individuals’ subjective judgements about their interests or well-being; they do not 
necessarily track objective properties of the external world (such as an individual’s monetary 
wealth or health status) or properties of passive experience (such as happiness in the hedonic 
sense).  (4) In the cases to which behavioural welfare economics is to be applied, latent 
preferences are assumed to be context-independent. 
 Infante, Lecouteux and I argue that this approach implicitly uses a model of an inner 
rational agent.  By this, we mean that it treats human agency as if each human being was 
made up of a neoclassically rational entity encased in, and able to interact with the world only 
through, an error-prone psychological shell.  Of course, we do not claim that behavioural 
economists think that human beings are really made up of these components.  The idea of the 
inner rational agent is merely a way of making vivid an implication of properties (1) to (4).  
To be more specific, these properties imply that the human individual has a latent capacity, 
constant across decision environments, to form context-independent subjective judgements 
on the basis of error-free reasoning.  This capacity is not always revealed in the individual’s 
actual decision-making behaviour, but its effects can be isolated by identifying what the 
individual would have chosen in the absence of errors.  ‘The inner rational agent’ is our name 
for that capacity.   
 In arguing that this model is problematic, Infante, Lecouteux and I direct most of our 
criticism at the assumption that latent preferences, as defined by the preference purification 
method, are complete and context-independent.  By treating context-dependent choices as 
revealing errors of reasoning, the preference purification approach implicitly assumes that for 
each individual there is some mode of latent reasoning which, if carried out correctly, would 
generate complete and context-independent preferences.  If one interprets preferences as 
subjective propositions that the relevant individual holds to be true, decision theory imposes 
consistency restrictions on the set of preference propositions that an individual 
simultaneously holds to be true, but it provides no explanation of how she arrives at those 
propositions.3  The advocates of preference purification invoke a concept of ‘correct’ or 
‘undistorted’ reasoning, latent in the real individual, which can somehow create complete and 
                                                          
3
 Decision theory and game theory are not theories of reasoning (that is, theories about the processes 
by which new propositions are inferred from existing ones); their concepts of ‘rationality’ are 
consistency conditions that restrict the sets of propositions that an unmodelled process of reasoning is 
allowed to generate.  For more on this, see Broome, 2013 and Cubitt and Sugden, 2014). 
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context-independent preferences; but they provide no account of what this reasoning actually 
is.  We accept that a defensible account of correct reasoning might show that the set of 
preference propositions that can be derived by that reasoning must satisfy certain 
consistency conditions, perhaps including some condition of independence of ‘irrelevant’ 
contextual features.  But we challenge the implicit assumption that, for every pair of choice 
objects x and y, correct reasoning can lead to one of the conclusions ‘x is preferable to y’, ‘y 
is preferable to x’, or ‘x and y are equally preferable’.  If one accepts that the preference 
relation that an individual can be derive by correct reasoning may be incomplete, one cannot 
infer errors of reasoning from context-dependent choices.  Thus, contrary to a crucial implicit 
assumption of the preference purification approach, context-dependency in actual choice may 
recur in the hypothetical choices that are supposed to reveal latent preferences. 
2.  Trying to make psychological sense of latent preferences 
Given that behavioural economists usually characterise their sub-discipline as economics 
with psychological foundations, it is surprising how little work has been done to explain 
latent preferences in psychological terms.  In the remainder of the paper, I consider whether 
the concept of latent preference might be given empirical content by interpreting it as a 
component of a psychological model of mental processing.   
 Some idea of the difficulties involved in this task can be had by considering an 
example I mentioned in the Introduction – people’s choices between alternative snacks to be 
delivered a week after that choice was made.  What has been found is that a typical 
individual’s choices between specific food items (for example, Mars bars and apples) are 
influenced by his current degree of hunger, even though the date and time of delivery of the 
snack (and hence, the presumably predictable degree of hunger at the time of delivery) is held 
constant.  This is a paradigm case in which choice is influenced by a contextual cue which 
seems to have no relevance for the individual’s welfare.  In broad-brush terms, the 
psychological mechanism behind this effect is easy to understand.  Mars bars and apples are 
goods with different mixes of attributes: the Mars bar is more energy-giving and perhaps (as 
viewed by the individual) tastier, the apple is more refreshing and (as an addition to the 
individual’s typical diet) healthier.  In deliberating about which of the two snacks to choose, 
the individual has to bring these various attributes to mind and strike a balance between them.  
The hungrier he is, the more attention he gives to those attributes on which the Mars bar is 
superior, and so the more likely it is that his deliberation will end in the choice of that option. 
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 Viewed in this way, what might seem to be irrational context-dependence is evidence 
about the underlying structure of the decision-making mechanism.  If one thinks in terms of 
the evolutionary origins of human psychology, the role played by attention in decision-
making can be understood as an integral part of a general-purpose mechanism for choosing 
between multi-attribute options – a mechanism that is (as if) efficiently designed to make use 
of other mental processes that tend to distribute attention towards what is currently important.  
(For example, the hungrier one is, the more important it is to be alert to possible sources of 
nutrition.) 
 But how, then, are we to separate the decision-making mechanism into components of 
‘rationality’ and ‘error’, and to be able to claim that the rational component retains the 
subjectivity of the real human individual?  The only possible way forward that I can see is to 
try to identify some particular distribution of attention as ‘correct’.  But how are we to do this?  
Recall that it is fundamental to the preference purification approach that the individual’s 
latent preferences represent his own subjective judgements.  Thus, we cannot define the 
correct distribution of attention in terms of some objective standard of the individual’s 
interest, analogous with fitness in an evolutionary model.  In the absence of such a standard, 
the idea of a ‘neutral’ distribution of attention between different attributes of choice options is 
ill-defined.  (To mention just one problem, suppose we define neutrality as equal attention to 
every attribute.  In the case of the snacks, is the effect of diet on weight a single attribute, or 
are health and slimness two separate attributes?)  It would be circular to define the correct 
distribution of attention as that which would generate ‘true’ latent preferences, since latent 
preferences have already been defined in terms of correct reasoning.   
 The core of the problem is that the attention-based mechanisms that explain the 
individual’s decisions also explain what, given the relevant choice context, he actually prefers 
or desires to do: he feels the desires that prompt him to choose as he does.  Viewed in the 
perspective of empirical psychology, the idea that he might have ‘true’ preferences that are 
different from the actual ones seems free-floating and redundant. 
 So far, I have been arguing in very general terms.  I will now try to give further 
support for my sceptical conclusions by looking at two concrete examples of the use of the 
concept of latent preference in behavioural economics and psychology.  
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3.  A behavioural economic model of attention 
My first case study is chosen as a characteristic example of how the concept of latent 
preference is used in behavioural economic models.  It is the analysis in a recent paper 
entitled ‘Salience and consumer choice’, by Bordalo, Gannaioli and Shleifer (hereafter ‘BGS’; 
2013) and published in the prestigious Journal of Political Economy.  BGS develop a model 
that is motivated by experimental findings from psychology, economics and marketing.  The 
core idea is expressed in a quotation from a psychological paper by Taylor and Thompson 
(1982, p. 175): ‘salience refers to the phenomenon that when one’s attention is differentially 
directed to one portion of the environment rather than to others, the information contained in 
that portion will receive disproportionate weighting in subsequent judgements’. 
 BGS’s core model is of a decision problem in which a consumer faces a choice set 
containing two or more goods, one and only one of which is to be chosen.  Each good k is 
characterised by the pair 〈qk, pk〉, where qk and pk are non-negative magnitudes, respectively 
representing the quality and price of that good.  The consumer knows the value of qk and pk 
for each good in the choice set.  Higher-quality goods are assumed to have higher prices.  In 
effect, BGS assume that quality is measured in its own units on a ratio scale (i.e. a scale on 
which the zero point is fixed but the unit of measurement is arbitrary).4  In BGS’s leading 
example, the reader is asked to imagine choosing between a bottle of French wine priced at 
$20 and a bottle of Austrian wine priced at $10 when the reader thinks the French wine ‘is 
perhaps 50 percent better’ (pp. 803–804).  I take it that, in this example, the consumer is 
thinking of units of quality as categorically different from units of price, and is trying to 
decide how to make trade-offs between the two attributes.  (For example, he might be 
thinking of the quality scale in terms of the answer he would give to a question asking him to 
rate the quality of the wine on a scale from 0 to 10; he rates the Austrian wine as 6 and the 
French wine as 9.)     
 The crucial assumption of the model is stated as follows:  
Without salience distortions, a consumer values good k with a linear utility 
function, uk  = qk – pk, which attaches equal weights to quality and price.  A salient 
thinker departs from [this utility function] by inflating the relative weights attached 
to the attributes that he perceives to be more salient.   … [W]e say that an attribute 
                                                          
4
 BGS actually say: ‘Quality and price are measured in dollars and known to the consumer’ (p. 807).  
Despite the literal meaning of this sentence, I think my interpretation is faithful to BGS’s intentions.  
It is only because quality and price are measured in different units that the consumer faces a non-
trivial choice problem. 
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(quality or price) is salient for good k in the choice set … if this attribute ‘stands 
out’ relative to the good’s other attributes.  (p. 807) 
I take the first sentence to mean that BGS are assuming a weighted linear utility function uk  
= αQ qk – αP pk, and are defining the unit in which quality is measured so that αP = αQ = 1.  
This utility function represents the consumer’s latent preference ordering over 〈quality, price〉 
pairs; these preferences can be described by a family of what BGS call ‘rational indifference 
curves’, which are linear and parallel.  That the marginal rate of substitution between units of 
price and quality is constant is a substantive modelling assumption; that each unit of quality 
is worth $1 to the ‘rational consumer’ is merely a convenient normalisation.  Unless the 
consumer is known to be ‘rational’, these indifference curves are not directly revealed in 
choices.  Notice that so far, the concepts of rationality and distortion have been given no 
independent definition or interpretation.  BGS have simply stipulated that, in their model, a 
particular family of linear indifference curve is to be called ‘rational’. 
 BGS then specify ‘how salience distorts the valuation of a good’ (p. 810).  The first 
step is to define a salience function which, for any choice set, for any good k in that set and 
for any attribute j, measures the degree to which the amount of attribute j ‘stands out’ (either 
as particularly high or particularly low – both are treated as sources of salience) relative to the 
average amount of that attribute in all goods in the choice set.  The second step is to identify, 
for each good, which of the two attributes stands out more (as measured by the salience 
function).  Thus, unless there is a tie, each good has a salient attribute – the attribute on 
which it stands out more. 
 For my purposes, it is sufficient to consider what BGS’s assumptions imply about 
salience when the choice set contains only two goods, with p1 > p2 and q1 > q2.  These 
assumptions imply that if q1/q2  > p1/p2, quality is the salient attribute for both goods; if that 
inequality is reversed, price is the salient attribute for both goods.  To get an intuitive feel for 
this property, think of the wine example.  Good 1 is the French wine, with p1 = 20 and q1 = 9.  
Good 2 is the Austrian wine, with p1 = 10 and q2 = 6.  Notice that q1/q2  <  p1/p2.  BGS’s 
assumptions imply that, in this case, the most salient feature of the French wine is its high 
price relative to the average price of the two wines; correspondingly, the most salient feature 
of the Austrian wine is its low price.  But now suppose that the qualities of the wines are the 
same as before, but the prices are p1 = 50 and p2 = 40; now q1/q2  > p1/p2   (Suppose the 
choice is being made in a restaurant rather than a supermarket.)  In this case, the most salient 
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feature of the French wine is its high quality and the most salient feature of the Austrian wine 
is its low quality.      
 BGS’s third step is to model the behaviour of a ‘salient thinker’ (i.e. a non-rational 
consumer) by ‘distort[ing] the utility weights’ that the consumer applies when evaluating 
goods.  For the rational consumer, both attributes have a weight of 1 in the evaluation of 
every good.  In contrast, when valuing any given good, the salient thinker uses a weight 
greater than 1 for its salient attribute and a weight less than 1 for its non-salient attribute 
(with the sum of the weights always equal to 2).  
 BGS apply this model to a wide range of consumer behaviour problems, using the 
general strategy of ‘introducing salience-based valuation into a “rational” economic model’ 
(p. 813).  In these applications, they describe the effects of salience as ‘distortions’ of what 
would otherwise be ‘rational’ choices.  All of this exemplifies the dualistic modelling strategy 
I described in Section 1.  The behaviour of BGS’s ‘salient thinker’ is determined by the 
interaction of two systems or processes – a set of context-independent latent preferences that 
are deemed to be rational, and a psychological mechanism which distorts these preferences.  
The choices of the salient thinker are determined by the distorted preferences, but the 
hypothetical choices of the rational consumer – that is, the consumer who acts on undistorted 
preferences – provide the normative benchmark.  This is a model with an inner rational agent. 
 But what is the function of this benchmark in BGS’s model?  The essence of the 
model is that the relative weights of the two attributes differ according to which attribute is 
salient.  But which attribute is salient for any given good in any given choice set depends 
only on the qualities and prices of the goods in that choice set, and these are defined 
independently of the consumer’s latent preferences.  Thus, any results that come about 
because of changes in relative attribute weights are independent of latent preferences.  The 
concept of latent preference serves no explanatory purpose. 
 BGS’s example of the two wines illustrates this point.  In the story, the consumer 
chooses the lower-quality Austrian wine when the two wines are priced at $10 and $20, but 
the higher-quality French wine when the prices are $40 and $50.  Leaving aside the 
possibility of perverse income effects, this pattern of choice is inconsistent with standard 
economic theory; but it has long been recognised as a common feature of human decision-
making (see, for example, Savage, 1954, p. 103).  It can be explained in various ways, for 
example by assuming diminishing sensitivity to changes in each attribute (Tversky and 
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Kahneman, 1991) or by assuming that expected prices act as reference points (Thaler, 1980); 
BGS provide a new explanation in terms of salience.  In the example, adding $30 to the price 
of each wine switches the salient attribute from price to quality.  (In general, adding any 
constant to the prices of each of two goods while keeping the qualities constant can cause a 
switch in the salient attribute; if there is a switch, it must be from price to quality.  Thus any 
switch in choice must be from the lower-quality good to the higher-quality good.)   But notice 
that all of this is true (in the model) irrespective of which good the consumer rationally 
prefers. 
 This does not mean that, in the world of the model, rational preferences are 
unobservable.  Consider a decision problem in which there is only one good in the everyday 
sense of the word, but the consumer can choose whether or not to buy it.  BGS represent this 
as a choice between 〈p1, q1〉 and 〈p2, q2〉, with 〈p2, q2〉 = 〈0, 0〉 representing ‘not buying’.  In 
this special case, BGS’s preferred assumptions about the salience function imply that the two 
attributes are equally salient, and hence that the salient thinker’s choices coincide with those 
of the rational consumer.  Thus, rational preferences are revealed in the consumer’s 
willingness to pay for individual goods in situations in which only one good is on offer.  
Remember, however, that up to this point, the concept of rationality has not been given any 
interpretation, except as the benchmark relative to which distortion is defined.  So the only 
interpretation that can be given to the proposition that willingness to pay reveals rational 
preferences is that rational preferences are defined by willingness to pay. 
 To put this another way, the empirical content of the model is contained in the idea 
that choices between goods are influenced by the relative attention given to their attributes, 
and that more salient attributes are given more attention.  A rational consumer is someone 
who always gives each attribute the right amount of attention.  But what is the right amount 
of attention?  In effect, BGS tell us that the right amount of attention to give each attribute is 
the attention that it is given in willingness-to-pay problems.  But they do not explain what 
this statement means. 
 One possible reconstruction of the missing argument runs as follows.  BGS are 
presupposing that the consumer has well-defined latent preferences between goods, defined 
as 〈quality, price〉 pairs, and that the latent utility of any good is independent of which other 
goods are in the choice set.  This presupposition is essential for the rest of the reconstructed 
argument.  For the cases that BGS’s model is intended to represent, it is deemed an 
acceptable simplification to assume a weighted linear utility function, with the implication 
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that the consumer has a context-independent utility weight αQ /αP for quality relative to price.  
Thus if (as in the wine example) his choices reveal implicit weights that are context-
dependent, there must be some cases in which he chooses contrary to his latent preferences.  
If the qualitative pattern of context-dependence is consistent with a psychological theory of 
salience and attention, it is reasonable to infer that these are cases in which his rational 
judgement of the utility of the chosen good is distorted by salience effects deriving from 
comparisons between this good and other goods in the choice set.  Thus, the best way to 
recover the consumer’s latent preferences is to observe his choices in situations in which 
there is as little scope as possible for cross-good comparisons.  Willingness-to-pay problems 
meet this requirement – at least in principle. 
 The ‘in principle’ qualification is needed because BGS extend their basic model to 
allow the salience of an attribute to depend not only on the content of the choice set, but also 
on ‘alternatives that the decision maker expects to find in the current choice setting’, and 
hence on the consumer’s expectations about prices (p. 820).  Thus, this method of eliciting 
latent preferences requires a setting in which ‘a good is evaluated in isolation and without 
price expectations’.  BGS suggest that such settings can be created in ‘lab experiments’ (p. 
828).  In the light of decades of attempts to elicit willingness-to-pay valuations in 
experiments and surveys, this suggestion seems extraordinarily optimistic.  Responses to 
willingness-to-pay and willingness-to-accept questions are known to be influenced by many 
kinds of irrelevant cues which draw attention to particular answers (Parducci, 1965; Slovic 
and Lichtenstein, 1968; Johnson and Schkade, 1989; Ariely et al. 2003).  For example, if the 
elicitation exercise begins with a question of the form ‘Would you be willing to pay $x?’, 
final responses are pulled towards $x; if respondents are asked to pick a point on a scale of 
possible values, responses are pulled towards the middle of the scale.  These ‘anchoring’ and 
‘range/frequency’ effects are particularly strong when (as in stated preference studies which 
try to elicit valuations for non-marketed goods, such as changes in environmental quality) 
there is no customary price that the respondent can use as a benchmark.  A natural 
interpretation of this evidence is that people find it very difficult to give a monetary valuation 
of any good in isolation and that, when required to do so, they unconsciously search for 
comparators and reference points. 
 So it is far from self-evident that individuals have well-defined context-independent 
latent preferences, ready to be elicited by economists.  Since latent preferences play no role in 
BGS’s explanation of actual choices, we have been given no reason to think that the mental 
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processes that lie behind these choices make use of any such construct.  But it is only by 
assuming the existence of latent preferences that the concepts of ‘rationality’ and ‘distortion’ 
can be given any independent meaning. 
4.    A psychological model of attention 
My second example is a seminal contribution to the psychology of decision-making under 
uncertainty – decision field theory, as proposed by Busemeyer and Townsend (hereafter ‘BT’; 
1993).  BT’s aim is ‘to understand the motivational and cognitive mechanisms that guide the 
deliberation process involved in decisions under uncertainty’.  They are particularly 
concerned with explaining two ‘unavoidable facts about human decision making’ – that the 
preferences of a given individual over given pairs of alternatives are subject to stochastic 
variation, and that the amount of time spent making a decision influences the final choice (pp. 
432–435).  Thus, they need a model in which deliberation about what to choose is a process 
that occurs over time and includes some random element. 
 BT’s basic model is of an individual who has to choose between two actions in a 
situation of uncertainty.  Uncertainty is represented by a set of alternative events, one and 
only one of which will occur.  An action is defined by the payoff that will occur in each event 
if that action is chosen.  Payoffs are implicitly assumed to be measured on a ratio scale and 
can be positive, zero or negative.  BT assume the existence of a utility function which assigns 
a real value u(x) to every payoff x.  However, the individual is not assumed to attach 
objective probabilities to events.  BT say that they are dealing with decisions under 
uncertainty (as opposed to risk), defined as problems in which ‘the decision maker must learn 
and infer the event probabilities from past experience’ (p. 436). 
  Notice the formal similarities between this problem and the one studied by BGS.  
BT’s ‘actions’ and ‘events’ are respectively analogous with BGS’s ‘goods’ and ‘attributes’.  
The ‘payoffs’ of actions in events are analogous with the ‘amounts’ of attributes that goods 
possess.  BGS’s model does not have an explicit analogue of BT’s utility function for payoffs, 
but that is only because BGS assume that utility is linear in amounts of attributes.5  In BT’s 
                                                          
5
 One disanalogy between the problems should be pointed out.  BT’s utility function is defined on 
payoffs, independently of the events in which they occur, and so event-independent utility measures 
are treated as inputs to the deliberation process.  On my reading, BGS implicitly assume attribute-
specific utilities as the analogous inputs. 
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model the individual’s problem is to make trade-offs between payoffs that occur in different 
events; in BGS’s model, it is to make trade-offs between amounts of different attributes. 
 It may help to keep in mind a concrete example of a decision problem to which BT’s 
model might be applied.  Consider Jane, who will be working in some city for a fixed period 
and has to decide whether to buy a house or to rent one.  She knows the current purchase and 
rental prices of property but is uncertain about how these prices will change over the period.  
If property prices rise, she will gain by buying rather than renting; if they fall, she will lose.  
She cannot assign objective probabilities to these events.  (In fact, no one can: if she consults 
supposed experts, she will find that their judgements differ.)   In this problem, the actions are 
‘buy’ and ‘rent’ and the events are alternative rates of change in property prices.  
 BT present decision field theory as a succession of amendments to deterministic 
subjective expected utility theory, interpreted as a decision rule which assigns a weight to 
every event (normalised so that the weights sum to 1) and chooses whichever action has the 
higher weighted average utility.  Expected utility theorists normally interpret each of these 
weights as a subjective probability, but BT offer a different interpretation, saying: ‘From a 
cognitive view, this weight reflects the amount of attention given to [the relevant event] on 
each presentation of the choice problem’ (p. 436; italics in original).  Thus, BT’s model, like 
BGS’s, is one in which decisions depend on the distribution of the decision-maker’s attention 
(between events or between attributes). 
 In decision field theory, deliberation is a process that occurs over time.  At any given 
moment during this process, there is a preference state measured on a real-valued scale; 
positive values represent strength of preference in favour of one of the actions, negative 
values represent strength of preference in favour of the other.  Deliberation begins with an 
initial preference state.  In ‘neutral’ versions of the theory, the initial state is zero, but BT 
allow the possibility that the initial state is ‘biased by past experience’ in the direction of the 
individual’s decisions in similar previous problems (p. 441).  This mechanism has the effect 
of reducing decision times and increasing the stability of choice in familiar problems.     
 Deliberation is represented as sequential sampling of events.  Each time an event is 
sampled, the utility difference between the two actions in that event is registered, and the 
preference state is updated in the direction of the action with the higher utility.  Deliberation 
ends when the preference state crosses a pre-determined upper or lower threshold; the action 
that is preferred in this state is then chosen.  Sampling an event is interpreted as attending to 
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its payoffs: ‘The basic idea is that attention may switch from one event to another within a 
single choice trial’ (p. 438). 
 Clearly, the probability that a given action is chosen depends on (among other things) 
the probabilities with which the different events are sampled.  Under certain neutral 
assumptions (including that the sampling probability for each event remains constant during 
the process, that the initial preference state is zero, and that the upper and lower thresholds 
have the same absolute value), the action that is more likely to be chosen is the one with the 
higher weighted average utility when each event is weighted by the probability that it is 
sampled at each stage of the process.  In other words, under these assumptions it is as if the 
individual has a subjective probability for each event and is more likely to choose the action 
with the higher subjective expected utility; but the as-if probability of any event is actually a 
measure of the individual’s propensity to attend to it in the deliberation process.  On a strict 
reading of BT, whether this as-if probability can be interpreted as the individual’s subjective 
judgement of the likelihood of the event itself is left open.  One might say that, in leaving this 
question open, BT are working in the spirit of Savage’s (1954) subjectivist interpretation of 
probability as a property of an individual’s preferences over actions, as revealed in her 
decisions. 
 In its most general form, decision field theory does not impose these neutral 
assumptions, and so does not necessarily generate decisions that can be rationalised by a 
stochastic form of subjective expected utility theory.  But, given the utility function, the 
initial preference state, the decision thresholds and a full specification of the mechanism 
which determines the distribution of the individual’s attention, BT’s model generates 
stochastic decisions and associated decision times.  With one exception, it does so without 
using any concept of ‘correctness’ in decisions.  
 The exception appears in BT’s discussion of the implications of alternative values of 
the threshold, on the simplifying assumption that the upper and lower thresholds have the 
same absolute value θ.  In this discussion, BT define the correct action as the action that 
produces the higher subjective expected utility.  They then say: 
… the threshold criterion θ controls speed–accuracy or cost–benefit trade-offs in 
decision making.  One the one hand, if the cost of prolonging the decision is low or 
the cost of making an incorrect decision is high, then a high threshold is selected.  
On the other hand, if the cost of prolonging the decision is high or the cost of 
making an incorrect decision is low, then a low threshold is selected.  (p. 440) 
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In a footnote to this passage, BT discuss a possible amendment to their model, according to 
which the value of θ decreases over the deliberation period.  Since the fact that the threshold 
has not been crossed after a long time is evidence that the difference in attention-weighted 
utility between the actions is relatively low, this amendment would implement what might be 
called a speed–accuracy trade-off by means of a simple and well-defined psychological 
mechanism.  If this is all that BT have in mind in the quoted passage, nothing much hangs on 
their definition of ‘correctness’.  Nevertheless, that definition is question-begging.  For BT, 
subjective expected utility is merely a construct which, under certain assumptions, can be 
read off from the decisions produced by the sequential sampling process; the as-if 
probabilities used in the definition of this construct are determined by the distribution of 
attention.  It is not clear why the individual’s propensities to attend to the different events 
should determine which action is deemed to be the correct choice. 
 Think about Jane choosing between buying a house and renting one.  If she 
deliberates in the way described by BT’s model, her attention will switch in a random fashion 
between thinking about a rising property market (and about the corresponding benefits of 
buying) and thinking about a falling property market (and about the corresponding benefits of 
renting).  Suppose that, if she deliberates for a long time and with many switches of attention, 
she can be expected to spend 60 per cent of the deliberation period thinking about a rising 
market and 40 per cent of the period thinking about a falling market.  How can that fact make 
the correct choice for Jane be the one that has the higher expected utility when the 
probabilities of the two events are set at 0.6 and 0.4? 
 One possible answer is that BT’s concept of ‘correct’ choice is not intended to be 
normative, in the sense of saying what the individual ought to choose; rather, it is an 
empirical concept, referring to the long-run tendency of deliberation.  (It would not sound so 
odd to say that Jane has a latent preference for the action that she would be more likely to 
choose after long deliberation.) 
 BT may also be thinking of possible extensions of their theory which could close the 
gap between the normative and empirical concepts of correctness.  Recall that in their 
definition of ‘uncertainty’, they refer to the event probabilities that the decision-maker has to 
learn from experience.  It would not be inconsistent with this definition to assume the 
existence of event probabilities, perhaps defined as relative frequencies in a (possibly 
hypothetical) series of exactly repeated trials.  Perhaps BT are entertaining the hypothesis that, 
if an individual faces exactly the same decision problem many times, the distribution of her 
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attention between events converges to the corresponding distribution of event probabilities, 
irrespective of contextual factors.  If this attention hypothesis were true (and given other 
neutral assumptions), the long-run tendency of repeated decision-making would be towards a 
state in which the action that was more likely to be chosen was the one with the higher 
weighted average utility when each event is weighted by its ‘objective’ probability.  One 
might call this action ‘latently preferred’ (or the ‘correct’ choice) in an empirical sense.  If 
one believed that expected utility theory was grounded on compelling principles of rationality, 
one might also call that action ‘correct’ in a normative sense.  And so, if the attention 
hypothesis were confirmed, one might claim that decision field theory isolates the 
psychological substrate of context-independent latent preferences of just the kind that 
behavioural welfare economics needs. 
 But there are some very big ‘if’s here.  Notice in particular that the argument sketched 
in the previous paragraph depends on assumptions that imply that, if the same decision 
problem is repeated many times, any systematic context-dependence effects gradually 
disappear.  If it really were the case that the choices of experienced decision-makers reliably 
revealed context-independent preferences, most behavioural economists would probably 
agree that the preferences to be used in normative analysis should be those that individuals 
reveal after having sufficient experience of relevant choice problems.  But the truth is that, 
after a quarter of a century of experimental investigation of the influence of experience on 
decision ‘anomalies’, the only general conclusion that can be drawn is that some but not all 
anomalies seem to decay with some but not all kinds of experience.6  I think we have to 
accept that context-dependent choice is not just a symptom of inexperience. 
 Indeed, one might think that the fundamental principles of decision field theory 
provide reasons for expecting context-dependence to be a pervasive and persistent feature of 
human decision-making.  If the distribution of an individual’s attention between alternative 
events or different attributes is a crucial determinant of her decisions, any ‘irrelevant’ factor 
which influences the distribution of attention will be capable of inducing context-dependent 
choices.  It does not seem at all self-evident that these influences will become less powerful 
or less effective as a decision-maker gains experience. 
                                                          
6
 This literature is too large and diverse to be usefully reviewed in a philosophically-oriented paper.  
Loomes, Starmer and Sugden (2010) report one experiment which found mixed results, and refer to 
other relevant papers.            
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 If context-dependence is a systematic and persistent consequence of psychological 
mechanisms that control the distribution of attention, behavioural welfare economics has to 
face the question to which BGS’s model provided no satisfactory answer: How can we 
identify context-independent latent preferences?  As an explanation of how attention 
influences choice, decision field theory is much deeper and more convincing than BGS’s 
economic model; but it does not answer that question.  What it does do is to help us 
understand why the presupposition of the question is mistaken.  If context-independent latent 
preferences play no role in psychological explanations of actual deliberation or actual choice, 
we should not expect psychology to tell us how to identify them. 
 5.  Discussion 
The aim of behavioural welfare economics, as I understand it, is to show how welfare 
judgements or public policy decisions can respect each individual’s own subjective 
preferences, as revealed in her choices after the effects of psychologically-induced errors 
have been controlled for.  My purpose in discussing these two models of attention was to 
explore whether a psychological analysis of decision-making as mental processing might 
allow an empirical distinction to be made between latent preferences and error.  These 
models are interesting because they represent attention-based mental processes that can 
induce context-dependent choices, and because their authors – particularly the authors of the 
model that belongs to behavioural economics – make use of concepts of ‘rational’ or ‘correct’ 
latent preference.   
 I have argued that these concepts serve no explanatory purpose.  In these models, 
individuals’ decisions depend on the relative attention given to different attributes or events, 
allowing context-dependent choices to be explained by causal factors that impact on the 
mental processes that control the distribution of attention.  Of course, if one chooses to define 
any particular preference as ‘correct’, there is a correspondingly ‘correct’ distribution of 
attention.  And given any such definition of correctness, there is a corresponding definition of 
‘error’, namely that an error occurs when an incorrect choice is made; the cause of the error is 
an incorrect distribution of attention.  One might choose to call this causal mechanism a ‘bias’ 
or ‘distortion’ of correct reasoning.  But none of this is any help in determining which 
preferences are latent in the individual and which are not. 
 If behavioural welfare economics is to succeed in its aim, it has to be able to identify 
some mode of reasoning or mental processing which, in some well-defined hypothetical 
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situation, would lead the individual to reveal context-independent latent preferences; it must 
have some defensible criterion for defining errors in reasoning; and it must provide good 
reasons for thinking that this situation is one in which such errors are particularly unlikely to 
occur.  I submit that it has not found any way of doing this, and that the prospects of success 
are poor.  The root of the problem, I believe, is that when economists (and indeed many 
philosophers, and perhaps even some psychologists) think about human agency, they find it 
hard to avoid using a mental model in which humans are ultimately rational beings.  This 
model may recognise that humans can hold irrational beliefs and make irrational decisions, 
but at some deep level, irrationality is understood as the product of mistakes.  These mistakes 
must be defined relative to some ‘true’ preferences – the preferences of the human 
individual’s ‘true self’.  This is the model of the inner rational agent.  We need to recognise 
that this model is pre-scientific. To questions about the role of latent preferences, the best 
answer is the one that, in another context, Laplace gave to Napoleon: I had no need of that 
hypothesis. 
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